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INEQUITY & ECONOMICS: 
FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT 
AND ESTATE TAX 
TREATMENT OF 
DE FACTO 
FAMILIES 
Michael Zaidel* 
The last decade has seen two trends suggesting the decline 
of the lifetime marital family unit: Both the divorce ratel and 
the number of couples living outside of marriage are increasing.2 
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate University School of Law 
1. As of March 1978, there were 90 divorced persons for every 1,000 married persons 
living as husband and wife in the United States, a 157% increase over 1960 (35/1,000). 
The ratio is higher for persons under 45 than for those over 45. Ratios for persons under 
30 years increased by 296% between 1960 and 1978 (from 28/1,000 to 91/1,000) while the 
increase for the 45-64 year-old age group was 83% (from 53/1,000 to 84/1,000) in that 
period. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, 
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS, SERIES P-20, 
No. 338, at 2-3 (May 1979) [hereinafter cited as MARITAL STATUS]. 
The increasing divorce rate is no longer accompanied by a parallel trend in the rate 
of remarriage. Since 1965, the ratio of divorces to first marriages has risen sharply while 
the ratio of remarriages to divorces has begun to drop. In 1965 there were 20 divorces 
and 150 remarriages for every 110 first marriages of women ages 14-44. By 1974 the 
number of divorces had risen to 32 for every 99 first marriages; the number of remar-
riages declined to 164 for every 32 divorces. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF FEDERAL 
STATISTICAL POLICY AND STANDARDS, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SOCIAL INDICATORS 1976, at 
66 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL INDICATORS]. 
2. The number of households with two unrelated adults of the opposite sex is in-
creasing. In 1978, there were 1.1 million "unmarried couple" households, a 117% in-
crease over 1970 when there were 523,000 such households. MARITAL STATUS, supra note 
1, at 3. The author found no statistics on the number of homosexual family units in the 
U.S. However, this Comment concerns all women who live in households headed by an 
unmarried woman. In March 1978, there were 437,000 households consisting exclusively 
of two females. MARITAL STATUS, supra note 1, at 42. An additional 8,037,000 fanillies 
have a female householder with no husband present. ld. at 5. These figures include lodg-
ers, partners, guests, and resident employees with no relatives in the household. ld. at 57. 
Census Bureau demographers predict an increase in the number of non-family (non-
husband-wife) households. In 1978, 25% of all households were non-family households. 
The Census Bureau projects that by 1995, 30% of all households will be non-family 
households, accounting for 32-53 % of the total increase in households between 1978-
1995. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, 
POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, PROJECTIONS OF THE NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS 
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Choice of lifestyle has 'an obvious impact on the legal status of a 
living arrangement. However, courts interested in protecting the 
interests of parties to legitimate, serious (albeit unmarried) rela-
tionships are not necessarily limited to outdated notions of the 
"meretricious"3 nature of a couple's living arrangement:' The 
tax system should keep pace. Equal treatment of taxpayers in 
similar situations and their abilities to pay are the proper con-
cerns of a tax scheme. Alternative households are basically fam-
ily situations; their limited duration appears less significant as 
the divorce rate rises. Yet, when men and women seek alterna-
tive relationships-primarily as unmarried heterosexual or ho-
mosexual couples-they face a federal tax program which ref-
uses to recognize the de facto (if not de jure) family structure of 
their household. IS 
Disparate tax treatment of married couples in common law 
AND FAMILIES: 1979 TO 1995, SERIES P-25, No. 805, at 2 (May 1979). 
3. Historically, courts were reluctaot to graot relief to couples who chose to forego 
marriage. They braoded such relationships meretricious, aod took the view that those 
who live outside the law may not avail themselves of the law's aid in settling property 
disputes arising from such living arraogements. Public policy considerations aod the 
cleao haods doctrine were common rationales. The parties were left in their relative posi-
tions aod property belonged to the holder of the title-generally the mao. See, e.g., Hew-
itt v. Hewitt, 77 ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979), rev'g 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 380 N.E.2d 
454 (1978). 
4. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) is the 
leading case. Existing California case law ali'eady provided property rights for a cohabi-
taot who had ao express contract, where sex was not the express or entire consideration. 
Vallera v. Valler'a, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943). See 1 CALIF. FAM. L. REP. 1002 
(1977). Marvin expaoded the possibilities of implied contracts, implied agreements, aod 
other tacit understaodings between the parties such as resultaot trust, constructive trust, 
quaotum meruit, or other equitable remedies to protect the expectations of unmarried 
couples. Marvin is said to have inspired at least 1,000 suits as well as a flurry of restric-
tive legislation. I. BAXTER, MARrrAL PROPERTY 11 (Supp. 1980). For cases aonotated ac-
cording to the points stressed in Marvin, see id., at 94. 
5. The Census Bureau defines a family as a group of two or more persons residing 
together who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption. SOCIAL INDICATORS, supra note 
1, at 71. The common law concept of family is somewhat broader. See, e.g., Hartley v. 
Bohrer, 52 Idaho 72, 77-78, 11 P .2d 616, 618 (1932) (a collective body of persons forming 
one household under one head aod domestic government, having reciprocal, natural, or 
moral duties to support or care for one aoother); State ex rel. Kemp v. Arnold, 234 Mo. 
App. 154, 158, 113 S.W.2d 143, 145 (1938) (a collective body of persons living together in . 
one home, in a permaoent aod domestic character, under one head or maoagement). But 
see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1973), upholding on other grounds a 
zoning ordinaoce which excluded from the definition of "family" three or more persons 
"living aod cooking together as a single housekeeping unit [who are] not related by 
blood, adoption, or marriage .... " [d. at 2. 
Women's Law Forum 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss3/4
1981] TAXATION OF DE FACTO FAMILIES 849 
vis-a-vis community property states led to remedial congres-
sional action a generation ago.6 The current inequity lies be-
tween married and unmarried couples. Correcting that imbal-
ance will again require congressional action. Nevertheless, this 
Comment argues that precedent exists for judicial remedy of 
some of the inequitable tax burdens of the unmarried couple. 
Tax planning is beyond the scope of this Comment, but sugges-
tions will be offered. Property rights and contract formation are 
treated only to the extent of their tax ramifications.'1 
I. MARRIAGE UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 
The Internal Revenue Codes (Code) does not define mar-
riage; it looks to state law for definitions of marriage, separation, 
and divorce.9 Although the Code treats each individual as a sep-
arate person for tax purposes,I° there are some significant tax 
advantages (and disadvantages)l1 for married persons12 as hus-
6. See note 32 infra. See also I.R.C. §§ l(a), 2, 6013 (income splitting provisions); 
2513 (gift splitting provision); 2056 (estate tax marital deduction); and 2523 (gift tax 
marital deduction). 
7. For discussions of property rights and contract formation by unmarried couples, 
see generally I. BAXTER, note 4 supra; Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses In-
cluding Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1976); Hav-
ighurst, Services in the Home-A Study of Contract Concepts in Domestic Relations, 41 
YALE L.J. 386 (1932); Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF. 
L. REv. 937 (1977); Pfaff, Death Is Not the Great Equalizer: Division of Non-Marital 
Property, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 157 (1980); Note, Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for Quasi-
Spousal Support, 30 STAN. L. REv. 359 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Beyond Marvin]; 
Note, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couple: The Outlook After Marvin, 12 Loy. L.A.L. 
REv. 409 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Property Rights of a Same-Sex Couple]; 1 CALIF. 
FAM. L. REP. 1002 (1977). 
8. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
9. I.R.C. § 143 sets out criteria for the determination of marital status; it does not 
define marriage. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) generally follows state law and rec-
ognizes common law marriages which are recognized by the state of the parties' resi-
dence. Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60. State characterizations are not,always determina-
tive, however, particularly where those characterizations may result in uneven treatment 
of taxpayers in different states. Id. Conflict between federal and state characterizations 
arises most frequently over property settlements and alimony payments. See note 160 
infra. 
10. M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAw STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE 
LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 156 (2d ed. 1979). 
11. For a discussion of the "marriage tax penalty," see note 32 infra. 
12. Legal marriage in California is created by a formal ceremony solemnizing the 
relationship. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1970). This has been required since common 
law marriage was formally abolished in California in 1895. Kay & Amyx, supra note 7, at 
939. Marital duties in California include mutual obligations of marital support, CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 5100 (West 1970), and child support, CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (West Supp. 1981). 
3
Zaidel: Taxation of of De Facto Families
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
850 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.ll:847 
bandI8 and wife l • which are not available to unmarried couples. 
Unmarried opposite-sex couples have some acknowledged 
property rights,I5 but the Code ignores the family nature of their 
living arrangement and treats these couples as individual un-
married persons. The Code takes more notice of the marital con-
tract than it does of the "family" nature of a marriage.I6 Unmar-
ried opposite-sex couples who reject ceremonial marriageI7 at 
least retain the option to elect it. Same-sex couples are denied 
that choice.Is No state recognizes homosexual marriages-same-
sex couples who choose to achieve the equivalent must create 
their own rights and duties by contract. IS 
II. CONTRACTS IN LIEU OF MARRIAGE 
Couples who plan to marry sometimes enter into antenup-
tial agreements,20 setting forth their respective property rights 
13. Husband is a generic term with a definite and precise meaning identical with the 
common or colloquial meaning. It signifies a man who has a wife. 41 C.J.S. Husband and 
Wife § 2 (1944). 
14. Wife defines a woman who has a husband and generally implies a lawful mar-
riage.Id. § 3. However, gender classifications can be reassigned. See M.T. v. J.T., 140 
N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (1976), cert. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976), 
holding that a transsexual who through successful sex reassignment surgery harmonizes 
her gender and genitalia so that she becomes physically and psychologically a woman is a 
member of the female sex for marital purposes. 
15. See materials cited note 7 supra. 
16. For example, a husband and wife have a duty at common law to cohabit, 41 
C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 11 (1941); but not under the Code. It provides that married 
persons may file income tax returns separately, recognizing that they may live apart. 
1.R.C. § l(d). 
17. There were 1,137,000 unmarried couple households in the United States in 1978. 
MARITAL STATUS, supra note 1, at 3. 
18. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (lesbian couple 
not entitled to a marriage license because what they proposed was not a marriage); Baker 
v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W. 2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) 
(marriage means state of union between persons of opposite sex). 
19. At least one pre-Marvin case, Garcia v. Venega, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 368, 235 
P.2d 89, 92 (1951), recognized the enforceability of property sharing agreements between 
"any two persons (two women or two men, for example) .•.• " See generally Property 
Rights of a Same-Sex Couple, supra note 7. 
20. An antenuptial contract is a contract made before marriage or an agreement in 
contemplation of marriage. Hewitt v. Gott, 132 Kan. 168, 294 P. 897 (1931). An antenup-
tial settlement is a contract or agreement before marriage, but in contemplation of and 
generally in consideration of marriage. The main provision is that the property rights 
and interests of either the prospective husband or wife or both of them, are determined 
or property is secured to either or both of them, or their children. In re Carnevale's Will, 
248 A.D. 62, 65, 289 N.Y.S. 185, 188 (1936). See generally 2 A. SINDEY, SEPARATION 
Women's Law Forum 
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after marriage. Couples who choose to live outside marriage may 
formulate contracts in lieu of marriage.21 Federal tax statutes in 
this area primarily concern transfers of wealth by individuals,.so 
policies favoring traditional marriage are not evident. 
Generally, property transferred in exchange for the promise 
of marriage is subject to gift tax,22 as is any transfer of property 
without full consideration in money or money's worth.23 Accord-
ing to the Treasury Regulations, "[a] consideration not reducible 
to a value in money or money's worth as love and affection, 
promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded, and the 
entire value of the property transferred constitutes the amount 
of the gift. "2' 
Although detriment to the donee is generally sufficient con-
AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90 (1980). 
21. See 2 A. SINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 100 
(Supp. 1980); P. AsHLEY, OH PROMISE ME BUT PUT IT IN WRlTING (1978) (discussing 
homosexual as well as heterosexual cohabitation). 
22. The gift tax applies to a transfer by gift whether the property is real or personal, 
tangible or intangible, and whether the transfer is direct or indirect. I.R.C. § 2511(a). 
Transfers made for a valuable consideration in money or money's worth are not subject 
to the tax. The gift tax is an excise tax on transfers of wealth. Bradford v. Commissioner, 
34 T.C. 1059, 1063 (1960). Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (1958), further states the gift tax is 
not imposed upon the receipt of the property by the donee, nor is it necessarily deter-
mined by the measure of enrichment resulting to the donee from the transfer, nor is it 
conditioned upon ability to identify the donee at the time of the transfer. The tax is 
measured by the value of the property passing from the donor. The gift tax is primarily 
concerned with depletion of a taxpayer's estate through lifetime transfers of wealth. 
The estate tax, a single assessment levied on the value of a person's e~tate, could be 
defeated if inter vivos gifts went untaxed. Accordingly, the estate and gift taxes are con-
strued together. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 311 (1945); Estate of Sanford v. Commis-
sioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939); Estate of R.R. Glenn v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 323 (1966). 
One of the basic changes of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 
Stat. 1521 (codified at I.R.C. § 2001(c», was to repeal the dual system of tax rates (the 
gift tax had been * of the estate rates) and replace it with a single unified rate schedule 
for use in computing both. Flanagan, Overview of Estate and Gift Tax Reform, 82 COM. 
L.J. 220 (1977). 
23. Transfers taxed as gifts are not confined to those lacking a valuable considera-
tion according to the common law concept of gifts, but "embrace as well sales, exchanges, 
and other dispositions of property for a consideration to the extent that the value of the 
property transferred by the donor exceeds the value in money or money's worth of the 
consideration given" in exchange. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958). "Money's worth" re-
quires more consideration than is necessary to support a contract. Commissioner v. 
Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945) (Congress intended "gifts" in its broadest, most com-
prehensive sense with the evident desire to "hit all the protean arrangements which the 
wit of man can devise that are not business transactions • • • ."). 
24. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1954). 
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sideration to support a contract,25 it is inadequate to avoid gift 
tax liability. For example, in Commissioner v. Wemyss,28 a 
widow and her child received trust income from her former hus-
band. The woman stood to forfeit her trust income upon remar-
riage. To offset her unwillingness to lose the income and induce 
her to marry him, her fiance transferred stock worth $149,000 to 
her. Affirming the Tax Court's holding that the transfer was a 
taxable gift, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]o allow detriment 
to the donee to satisfy the requirement of 'adequate and full 
consideration' would violate the purpose of the statute and open 
the door for evasion of the gift tax. "27 
Under the same principle, any transfer of property as part 
of a contract in lieu of marriage will result in a taxable gift.28 
The gift is complete, hence taxable, when the donor so' parts 
"with dominion or control as to leave. . . no power to change its 
disposition . . . ."29 Beneficial use of the property must be 
transferred; mere legal title is not enough.30 
. m. INCOME SPLITTING POSSIBILITIES 
Once a household is established, the inequities are clearer. 
The most visible tax advantage of the married couple is the op-
portunity to file a single joint return.31 Congress enacted the 
joint return in 1948 to remedy the imbalance between commu-
25. Detriment to the promissee is generally adequate consideration, whether or not 
any benefit accrues to the promisor. 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 122 (1963). 
26. 324 U.S. 303 (1945). 
27. Id. at 308. This case was decided the same day as Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 
(1945), which held that estate taxes and gift taxes are construed in pari materia. In 
Wemyss, the Court reasoned the gift tax "aims to reach those transfers which are with-
drawn from the donor's estate." 324 U.S. at 307. 
28. See I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2502(d). If the donor does not pay the tax, the donee may be 
required to discharge the liability to the extent of the value of the property received. 
I.R.C. § 6324(b). For other potential tax consequences to the recipient, see discussion of 
sexual services cases, notes 56-64 infra and accompanying text. 
29. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958). 
30. The gift tax is "applicable only to a transfer of a beneficial interest in property. 
It is not applicable to a transfer of bare legal title to a trustee." Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-
l(g)(l) (1958). 
31. IRC § 6013(a) states that: "[a] husband and wife may make a single return 
jointly of their income taxes • • • even though one of the spouses had neither gross in-
come nor deductions •••• " Husband and wife are taxed as if each were an unmarried 
person who earned one-half their combined income. I.R.C. § l(a). The lower rates appli-
cable to each half generally result in a lower combined tax. 
Women's Law Forum 
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nity property and common law jurisdictions.82 Previously, mar-
ried couples in common law states often attempted to achieve 
the benefits of community property for tax purposes by as-
signing the rights to income to whichever spouse was in the 
lower tax bracket-generally without success. De facto families 
who attempt the tax savings of the joint return through private 
income-splitting agreements will encounter the same resistance 
from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts, as did 
their predecessors. 
The general principle for married and unmarried families is 
that income from personal services is taxable to the person who 
earns it. Both the assignment of rights to future income from 
services to be performed88 and the assignment of rights to in-
32. The Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 301, 62 Stat. 114 (1948) (amending 
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 12, 53 Stat. 5 (now I.R.C. § l(a» introduced the joint 
return to equalize the opportunities for income splitting in the common law states with 
those of the eight community property jurisdictions (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisi-
ana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington). M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 
193. See, e.g., Poe v. Seaborne, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (state law controls). The advent of 
the joint return made marital status important in federal income taxes for the first time 
because income splitting reduced taxes, making it advantageous to be married. B. BITT-
KER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 348 (4th ed. 1972); Mess, 
For Richer, For Poorer: Federal Taxation and Marriage, 28 CATH. U.L. REv. 87, 104 
(1978). 
Because of the progressive nature of the tax schedule (the higher the income, the 
higher rate at which increments are taxed) allowing a married couple to split the income 
means the couple is effectively taxed at a lower rate than if all the income were attribu-
table to the person who earned it. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, § 803,83 Stat. 487 (codified at I.R.C. § 1), the difference between single and married 
couples' rates was as great as 42% at some income levels. When single persons com-
plained that they were discriminated against for choosing to remain unmarried, the 1969 
Act retained the married taxpayer as the basic unit and reduced the single taxpayer's 
rate schedule. Now the rate structure discriminates against some married couples. If, for 
example, one partner of the marriage produces all or most of the income, he or she pays 
less tax than if single. If both spouses work, however, the second income is added to the 
first and is thus placed in a higher marginal tax bracket than if it stood alone. For 
couples filing jointly who earn comparable salaries, the higher tax bracket more than 
offsets the lower rate schedule for joint returns-the so-called "marriage tax penalty." 
See Mess, supra, at 96. 
A married couple's scheme to avoid the "marriage penalty" failed when the Tax 
Court decided their foreign year-end divorces, designed to give them the status of single 
taxpayers, were invalid. Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980). The taxpayers re-
lied on I.R.C. §§ 143(a), 6013(d)(1)(A), providing that marital status is determined at 
year's end. IRS argued the divorces were sham transactions, relying on Rev. RuI. 76-255, 
1976-2 C.B. 40. The court avoided that determination, ruling only that the foreign courts 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings, and that state law was 
binding. 
33. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (assignment of future earnings to spouse inef-
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come already earned but not yet receivedM are ineffective to di-
vert the tax. The income is taxed back to the party who per-
forms the services. 
Income from property is treated differently. Obviously, 
property can be given away and the future income will be 
shifted to the donee.35 Consequently, even the value of personal 
services which went into creating property (a patent or copy-
right, for example) will nQt be taxed back to the source, pro-
vided that more than the bare right to collect income is trans-
ferred. For example, if A gives a bond coupon to B so that B 
becomes the owner of the coupon and entitled to receive the in-
come, but A retains the underlying bond, the income from the 
coupon will be taxed to A.36 Here, A has retained too much con-
trol-in this case, the ability to determine future income flow 
from the underlying property. A gift of the bond itself, on the 
other hand, would permanently vest the income in the new 
owner. 37 
On this same principle, a fractional interest of the underly-
ing property can be given away and a portion of the income 
thereby shifted.38 Thus, if one person purchases income-produc-
ing real estate, taking title jointly with another person, one-half 
the income is taxable to each of the co-owners.39 
fective to divert tax). Accord, Rev. Rul. 79-132, 1979-1 C.B. 62 (military chaplain under 
vow of poverty is taxed on income he turns over to his religious order). But cf. Rev. Rul. 
76-479, 1976-2 C.B. 20 (rule does not apply to payments received by agent on behalf of 
principal and turned over to principal). 
34. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940) (rights to renewal commissions previ-
ously earned but assigned to a family trust were taxable to the person who earned them). 
35. For gift tax consequences, 8ee text accompanying notes 110-117 infra. 
36. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (interest coupons detached and given to 
son did not transfer the income to the son). 
37. See id., at 115. 
38. Hllim v. Fitzpatrick, 262 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1959). In Heim, the taxpayer assigned 
rights to his invention to a company, retaining the option to cancel. He then assigned 
75% of that contract to his wife and two children. The court held the future income was 
not taxable to him because more than collection rights were assigned-these were gifts of 
income-producing property. 
39. See Finney v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1976), appeal dismissed, 
nolle pros.; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(5) (1958). For example, if A with her own funds 
purchases property and has the title conveyed to herself and B as joint owners, with 
rights of survivorship which may be defeated by either party severing her interest, there 
is a completed gift of one-half the value of the property. [d. 
Women's Law Forum 
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Joint bank accounts are treated differently than other forms 
of jointly owned property.40 If only one person deposits funds in 
an account from which either party may withdraw, all interest 
income is includable in the income of the depositor!l No taxable 
gift occurs so long as the contributor retains the power to take 
possession of the entire contribution, even though the contribu-
tor may be a co-owner under state law!2 Only when the noncon-
tributor withdraws funds does a completed gift occur, and then 
only to the extent it exceeds his or her contribution!3 Therefore, 
splitting interest income from savings accounts requires a parti-
tion unless the funds are so commingled that the sources are un-
ascertainable. In that case, interest income is divided equally 
among the co-owners!4 
IV. INTERNAL ECONOMICS: INCOME AND GIFT TAXES 
A. SUPPORT AS INCOME TO THE HOUSEKEEPER 
Day-to-day economic exchanges of money, property, and 
services within the marital household go largely untaxed because 
of policy decisions to exclude them from the tax base!15 They are 
potentially taxable to members of the non-marital household. 
The primary reason the value of support received by a house-
keeping spouse is not included in his or her income is the mari-
tal support duty,46 although administrative convenience un-
40. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (1958); Rev. Rul. 54-143, 1954-1 C.B. 12. 
41. Treas. Reg. § 2511-1(h)(4) (1958). 
42. See id.; L. THOMAS, TAX CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE, SEPARATION AND DIVORCE 
64 (2d ed. 1976). 
43. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (1958). The $3,000 annual gift exclusion, provided 
by I.R.C. § 2503(b), was intended to make it unnecessary to report small transfers. S. 
REP. No. 665, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 496, 525. 
44. Finney v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1976), appeal dismissed, nolle 
pros .. In Finney, one-half of separated spouses' jointly held funds was taxable to each. It 
was inlmaterial that the husband received no part because he nonetheless had an un-
restricted right to it. 
45. See notes 77-81 and accompanying text, infra. 
46. At common law, the husband is legally obligated to support his wife and chil-
dren. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife § 329 (1968). The wife has no corresponding 
common law obligation. [d. § 334. In .California, the support obligation is mutual. CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 5100 (West 1970). Payments in discharge of this obligation are neither de-
ductible by the payor nor, income or gift to the recipient. See Crittenden v. United 
States, [52-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 10,870 (E.D. Wis. 1952). 
One commentator has criticized these marital duty classifications as possibly uncon-
stitutional, overbroad generali2ations based on sex. Note, Estate Tax Section 2040: 
Homemaker's Contribution to Jointly Owned Property, 29 TAX LAW 623, 629 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Homemaker's Contributions]. Thus, even if the common law recog-
9
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doubtedly plays its part. Thus, a housewife's allowance is 
normally considered neither income47 nor gift48 to her; similarly, 
a joint bank account used to defray household and living ex-
penses is ordinarily not a gift!9 
Unmarried household members have neither common law 
nor statutory obligations to support one another. Exchanges of 
money, property, or services within the de facto family raise 
questions of income tax liability. 150 The Code specifically ex-
cludes gifts from gross income,151 but does not define "gift." The 
Supreme Court has declined to formulate a definitive test. 152 The 
determination of when a payment is to be treated as a gift, de-
pends "ultimately on the application of the fact finding tribu-
nal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct [and] 
the totality of the facts of each case."153 It has held (albeit in a 
nizes the wife's duty to render domestic services, basing application of a federal statute 
on such a gender-based classification may violate the fifth amendment. The Supreme 
Court has held a statute which provides unequal treatment for men and women similarly 
situated, where the difference in treatment bears no rational relationship to the purpose 
of the statute, violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the 
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The concept of a wife's duty 
to provide domestic services to her husband is clearly a classification based on sex and 
one arising from archaic and overbroad generalizations about gender-based roles. ld. at 
629-30. 
47. Burkhart v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 275, 278 (1928) (allowance as compensa-
tion for acting as housewife represented merely a personal expense to husband, not taxa-
ble income to wife). 
48. SUpport is relative to the family's standard of living. Hill v. Commissioner, 88 
F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1937). One commentator would find a presumption of a gift for any 
excess amount a wife accumulates if retained with the husband's consent. L. THOMAS, 
supra note 42, at 88. If the allowance is a reasonable amount, it is doubtful Congress 
intended it to be subject to gift tax. If the allowance were substantially increased for no 
apparent reason, it would be a prima facie case for gift taxation. 
49. See Crittenden v. United States, [52-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 10,870 (E.D. Wis. 
1952) (trust payments made to maintain taxpayer's home and to support and educate his 
children did not exceed the actual expenses incurred and therefore were not taxable 
gifts). 
50. 1.R.C. § 61. Gross income includes income received in any form, be it money, 
property, or services, and from whatever source derived. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1957). 
Similarly, payment of an obligation or liability on behalf of a third person is income to 
that person. E.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
51. 1.R.C. § 102. 
52. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278, 284-89 (1~60). 
53. ld. at 289. While not determinative, the donor's intent is critical. ld. at 285-86. 
With business associates, part of the examination of the total facts includes scrutinizing 
how the donor treated the transation for his or her own tax purposes. A deduction 
claimed for a bUsiness expense suggests it was not meant as a gratuity. This test is not 
useful with most non-business-related expenditures because personal expenses are gener-
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commercial context) that a payment in return for services ren-
dered or arising froin the "constraining force of any moral or 
legal duty" is income to the recipient regardless of how the par-
ties characterize the payment. IS' Courts have applied statutory 
languagelSlS broadly in determining whether payments supporting 
a nonfamily member should be taxed as income. In two leading 
cases involving true meretricious relationships, the results were 
inconsistent. 
Margaret Brizendine was convicted of prostitution five 
times before 1945.1S6 She met a man who promised to buy her a 
house and support her if she gave up prostitution. She then mar-
ried another man. The first kept his promise: He furnished a 
$2,000 down payment for a house, arranged financing, provided 
mortgage payments, and gave her at least an additional $25 per 
week.1S7 The court held her promise to relinquish prostitution 
and grant him companionship was sufficient consideration to 
make the payments includable in her gross income.1S6 
In contrast, a man provided Greta Starks a substantial 
amount of cash and property, including a house, automobile, 
and living expenses over a five-year period.1S9 She claimed a 
"very personal relationship"60 with the man and the court classi-
fied the payments as gifts.61 The Starks court relied on more 
than testimony as to the warmth of the relationship-it looked 
also to the fact that the woman received $41,000 in 1955 and 
only $5,000 or $6,000 in other years.62 The payments to Brizen-
ally not deductible. I.R.C. § 262 (no deduction for personal, living, or family expenses). 
54. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (citing Bogardus v. Com-
missioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937». 
55. I.R.C. § 61 (gross income includes income received in any form, from any 
source). 
56. Brizendine v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 149 (1957). 
57. Id. at 150. 
58. Id. at 151. 
59. Starks v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 676 (1966). 
60. Id. at 677. 
61. The Tax Court found it noteworthy that the government's attorney failed to ask 
the man involved whether he considered the payments gifts. Two writers view this con-
cern with the donor's motive as reflecting "the importance of the human element in the 
taxing process." R. SOMMERFELD & G. STREULING, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUB-
LIC ACCOUNTANTS, TAX RESEARCH TECHNIQUES 32 (1976). While this seems a flimsy basis 
on which to distinguish the cases, it suggests the importance of the donor's intent under . 
the general guidelines of Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
62. Starks v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) at 677. 
11
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dine were more uniform in amount and regularity, but Brizen-
dine's record as a prostitute, and her husband's avocation as a 
gambler, suggested the presence of unreported, illegal income. 
Because the IRS had reconstructed Brizendine's income based 
on known expenditures, S3 the Tax Court did little more than 
recognize the obvious: She and her husband had significantly 
underreported their income. The "agreement" merely furnished 
a ready rationalization to sustain the agency's findings.64 
Some courts view meals, lodging, and other support received 
by a de facto family homemaker as compensation for services 
rendered rather than as support, S5 even though basic contract 
law generally does not view a housekeeper's services as an ex-
change for compensation.ss Income is taxable in whatever form 
received, including cash, property, and the free use of property.S? 
The value of support received appears to fall within the defini-
tion of gross income. Two cases seem to support this 
proposition. 
For example, W.T. Hamilton felt obligated, but was incapa-
ble of caring for his 81-year old mother.ss He arranged for an old 
family friend in need of a home to care for his mother and per-
form light housekeeping chores. Hamilton provided the house-
keeper a place to live and paid her cash to care for his mother. 
63. She filed no income tax returns for the taxable years ending 1945-1949. Brizen-
dine v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) at 149. 
64. See R. SOMMERFELD & G. STREULING, supra note 61, at 31. 
65. See text accompanying notes 68-71 infra. 
66. Many of the early cases on compensation for services rendered in the household 
are claims against the estate. Generally, there was no expectation of wages. Rather, 
plaintiff often hoped for and was encouraged to expect a legacy. Havighurst, supra note 
7, at 392. See generally sources cited note 7 supra. 
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1{a) (1957) explains that income may be realized in the form 
of services, meals, accommodations, stock, or other property as well as in cash. Most 
cases dealing with tax treatment of free lodging have involved the employer-employee 
relationship. Chandler v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 165 (1949), aff'd, 119 F.2d 623 (3d 
Cir. 1941) (rent-free use of a house owned by a corporation wholly controlled by the 
taxpayer was given not as a gratuity but as compensation for services rendered and was 
properly includable in income); Dean v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 256 (1947), appeal dis-
missed, 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951); Roberts v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.M. (CCH) 599 
(1948). But see Richards v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1941) (absent evidence 
that the rental value was compensation for services, it was a gift from the corporation to 
its stockholders, not taxable income); Peacock v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 
1958), rev'g 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 1252 (1956). 
68. Hamilton v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 927 (1960). 
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The Tax Court determined that the payment of essential living 
expenses was compensation for services.6801 
D.L. Angstadt met and began dating an acquaintance.69 
Both were employed, but he suggested that if she served as a 
housekeeper and generally cared for their day-to-day needs, she 
and her daughter could live with him. Angstadt, in return, of-
fered to furnish food, shelter, and all their living needs. The par-
ties understood that they were not entering into a common law 
marriage and that neither was obligated to continue the arrange-
ment. '70 Again, the Tax Court held that, because the arrange-
ments were economically beneficial to the parties, payment of 
essential living expenses was compensation for services ren-
dered. '71 Both cases arose in the context of a claimed personal 
exemption for the housekeeper, not on whether any support re-
ceived was taxable income. The pronouncements on compensa-
tion justified disallowing the claimed dependency exemption;'72 
they are dictum on the issue of income tax liability for the value 
of support received. '73 
B. THE VALUE OF HOUSEKEEPER'S SERVICES AS INCOME TO THE 
HOUSEHOLDER 
Domestic services have value. '74 A housewife's services to her 
68.1. 34 T.C. at 929. 
69. Angstadt v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M, (CCH) 693 (1964). 
70. ld. at 693. 
71. ld. at 695. Accord, Massey v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1931) (single 
man maintained a home for his mother and sister; contributions to the sister's support 
were in return for the performance of duties as a housekeeper). 
72. For a discussion of dependency exemptions for household members see § V 
infra. 
73. Both Hamilton and Angstadt involved the individual income tax returns of the 
primary householders. The courts did not discuss whether the housekeepers included in 
income on their own returns the value of support received. 
74. The Social Security Administration fixed the annual value at $4,705 in 1972. 
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, NOTE No.9, Eco-
NOMIC VALUE OF A HOUSEWIFE (DHEW Pub. No. 75-11701)(1975), noted in Bruch, supra 
note 7, at 113. One commentator placed that value at $13,364. Galbraith, A New Eco-
nomic Role for Women?, 155 CURRENT 41 (1973). The total value of homemakers' ser-
vices has been calculated to be roughly one-fourth the Gross National Product. ld. 
One commentator states that the most significant contribution the women's move-
ment has made to the problem of economic justice at divorce is calling attention to the 
value of homemaker's services. As of 1979, 22 states had by statute or court decision 
authorized divorce courts to consider the homemaker's contribution in determining prop-
erty distribution or setting the amount of alimony or separate maintenance. I. BAXTER, 
supra note 4, at 8. Along with this recognition has developed an accompanying trend 
13
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family are a major source of imputed income,'1G ~ven though 
these services go untaxed. They are considered imputed income, 
and not an exchange of labor because of a tacit recognition by 
the Treasury that the services are self-generated and totally con-
sumed within the family.'16 The IRS has never attempted to 
draw imputed income from domestic services into the tax base,'1'1 
probably because of a lack of authority in the Code for taxing 
imputed income,'18 doubts of its constitutionality,'19 a concern 
toward decreasing the amount and duration of alimony so that, on balance, the egalita-
rian principles of the women's movement have been used to remove prior advantages 
without compensating advances. Id. at 9. See generally Comment, Equity and Econom-
ics: A Case for Spousal Support, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 443 (1979). 
With nonmarital partners, an implied agreement may lead to the presumption the 
services were rendered gratuitously, particularly in states other than California. See, e.g., 
York v. Place, 273 Or. 947,949,544 P.2d 572, 574 (1975) (presumption that the services 
were rendered as a gratuity extended to nonmarital partners because their domestic 
union was essentially a family relationship). 
I.R.C. § 2040(c), added by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 511, 92 
Stat. 2881, recognizes the value of services contributed by a surviving spouse and joint 
owner of property, provided the property is used in a business or farm in which she or he 
materially participated. The surviving spouse's participation affects the extent to which 
jointly owned property is taxed in the decedent's estate. Even this recognition ignores 
services in the home. 
75. Imputed income is defined as a "flow of satisfactions from durable goods owned 
and used by the taxpayer, or from goods and services arising out of the personal exer-
tions of the taxpayer on his own behalf." Note, The Constitutionality of the Taxation of 
Imputed Income, 9 VAL. L. REV. 221, 221 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Taxing Imputed 
Income] (citing Marsh, Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 514, 514 (1943». 
For example, if a housekeeper hires someone to prepare meals, clean, and perform 
domestic services she will have to work to produce additional income (which will be 
taxed) to pay the other person. But if she stays home and does her own work, no taxable 
income is generated even though the net benefit to the family is the same. B. BITTKER & 
L. STONE, supra note 32, at 64. 
76. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 21. 
77. Id. A 1947 Treasury study determined that, because of the housewife's substan-
tial contributions, a married couple does not need twice the money income of a single 
person to maintain the same standard of living. Comparison of the standard deductions 
(now Zero Bracket Amounts) allowed single persons and married couples in subsequent 
years suggests that the housewife's contribution is actually indirectly taxed through a 
relatively lower standard deduction. B. BITTKER & L. STONE, supra note 32, at 356. In a 
commercial context, the IRS has taxed what verges on imputed income. See Commis-
sioner v. Minzer, 279 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1960) (commissions received by a life insurance 
broker on policies upon his own life are income to the broker); Commissioner v. Daehler, 
281 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1960). In Daehler a real estate salesman purchased for himself real 
estate listed with a second broker who split the commission with the first broker's em-
ployer. The employer gave his portion of the commission to the employee. The court 
held the amount was compensation for services and not a discount in sale price. 
78. M. CHlRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 21. 
79. [d. See also Taxing Imputed Income, supra note 75. 
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over valuation, so and a sense that the concept is vague and theo-
retical to the general public. SI Enforcing such provisions under 
our self-reporting income tax system could prove an administra-
tive nightmare,s2 although there are no guarantees the IRS will 
never attempt to or cannot tax such services.ss 
Treasury regulations argue that the value of domestic ser-
vices performed by the de facto family housekeeper are income 
to the beneficiary,S' but there is no case law taxing as income the 
value of these services.s5 Valuation poses a problem. The value 
of services might readily be determined in the case of barter 
clubs86 where all members are professionals exchanging profes-
sional services.87 It is far more difficult to accurately value the de 
facto housekeeper's domestic services because of the presence of 
an element of gift in those services. Like the marital unit, the de 
facto family's services are imputed income to that living unit. 
80. In most cases the real value is less than the fair market value of services because 
the individual might choose to do without the service if he or she had to pay for it. M. 
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 21. 
81. ld. 
82. The American income tax system relies heavily on wage withholding to collect 
most of the personal income tax. See E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAETZ, supra note 75, at 115. 
Wage withholding was enacted because most taxpayers are unable to save enough money 
to pay their taxes in one installment at year's end. The United States government's reli-
ance on a self-executing system to assess and collect most income tax further argues 
against taxing imputed income. ld. 
83. It would probably take specific congressional action to do so. See M. CHIREL-
STEIN, supra note 10, at 20. 
84. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1957) (if services are paid for in exchange for 
other services, the ·fair market value of such other services taken in payment must be 
included in income as compensation). 
85. The Tax Court has found an implied agreement that the value of the house-
keeper's services equals the value of food, lodging, and other support. See, e.g., Massey v. 
Commissioner, 51 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1931); Hamilton v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 927 (1960); 
Provita v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1318 (1970); Angstadt v. Commissioner, 27 
T.C.M. (CCH) 693 (1968). This reasoning has been used to deny the householder a per-
sonal exemption for the housekeeper, not to tax the services as income to the house-
holder. See notes 68-71 supra and accompanying text. 
86. More than $13 billion in goods and services are bartered annually in the United 
States. Mutual Credit Buying Systems, Inc., of Los Angeles, Calif., transacts $1 million 
annually among its 3,500 members. Useful Exchange in Reston, Va., offers a community-
wide pool of 100 personal services exchanged on an hour-for-hour basis. C. STAPLETON & 
P. RICHMAN, BARTER: How TO GET ALMosT ANYTHING WITHOUT MONEY 37-40 (1978). 
87. Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60, offers this example: "In return for personal legal 
services by a lawyer for a housepainter, the housepainter painted the lawyer's [home]. 
Both the lawyer and the housepainter are members of a barter club •••• All the mem-
bers of the club are professional or trades persons." Both must include in income the fair 
market value of services received. 
15
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Because they are not part of an arm's length, bargained for ex-
change of labor, as envisioned in the statutory definition of gross 
income,88 the value of such services does not belong in the tax 
base. De facto families, like their married counterparts, view 
housekeeping services as an obligation of ordinary family life, 
not as a wage earning position.89 
There are some additional arguments for excluding from the 
income of the homemaker the value of support received, even if 
it appears to fit within the tax base. The Code excludes from 
income the value of "meals and lodging furnished on the prem-
ises for the convenience of the employer."9o Meals and lodging 
are excludable when received by a live-in maid.91 This reasoning 
can be extended to both the housewife and the de facto family 
housekeeper. Alternately, the situation can be viewed as simply 
a sharing of personal expenses. There is some authority for this 
view because reimbursements for car pooling are not income.92 
Under this theory, the income producing partner pays the 
housekeeper's share of personal living expenses and is reim-
bursed through services. 
C. RECIPROCAL GIFTS AND THE GIFT TAX 
Household services rendered by an unmarried cohabitant 
have traditionally been considered gifts under contract law.98 
Household services are not subject to gift tax.94 Free lodging 
might be, because the permissive use of property involves the 
88. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61 (1957). 
89. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 162-63. 
90. I.R.C. § ll9(a) states that the value of meals and lodging furnished to an em-
ployee, the employee's spouse, or dependents is excluded from the gross income of the 
employee, provided the meals are furnished on the premises and acceptance of the lodg-
ing on the business premises is a condition of employment. The exclusion is a tacit recog-
nition that in-kind payments are worth considerably less than retail or fair market value. 
See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 18; Benaglia v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 838 
(1937). 
91. According to Treas. Reg. § 1.ll9-1(c) (1956) the term "business premises of the 
employer" generally means the place where the employee is employed. Consequently, 
meals and lodging furnished in the employer's home to a domestic servant are treated as 
meals and lodging furnished on the business premises of the employer. 
92. Rev. Rul. 55-555, 1955-2 C.B. 20. 
93. Beyond Marvin, supra note 7, at 384. 
94. The gift tax is imposed only on "the transfer of property." I.R.C. § 2501. No tax 
is payable on donated services. R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 111.03[2] (4th ed. 1978). 
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transfer of a property right. However, given the gift tax concern 
with depletion of a taxpayer's estate through inter vivos trans-
fers, sharing property cannot be said to diminish a taxpayer's 
accumulated wealth within the purpose of that law. 
There is little case law on the gift tax liability of shared 
property. Rent-free lod~ng is similar to the use of interest-free 
loans and may be profitably compared. The courts have uni-
formly rejected attempts by the IRS to tax such 10ans,915 a re-
fusal predicated in part on the absence of any realization of cash 
income and in part on the freedom not to make a profit.96 
There is a distinction, after all, between (1) permitting a 
friend to share your residence, and either (2) paying that per-
son's rent elsewhere, or (3) making a gift of money with which to 
rent or purchase housing.97 The distinction rests on the com-
pleteness of the gift.98 Because control and dominion have not 
passed in the case of mere permissive use, no gift has been 
made. 99. The gift tax is concerned with depletion of an estate 
95. E.g., Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 
1978); Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Dean v. Commis-
sioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961). In Crown, the taxpayer was a one-third partner in Areljay 
Co .• Areljay made approximately $18,000,000 in non-interest-bearing and demand notes 
on open account to 24 trusts established for various relatives. The court followed John-
son, which held that because the loan principal remains in the lender's estate at death, 
nothing about the transfers permitted the lender to .avoid future estate tax by reducing 
the current estate via inter vivos gifts of principal. 67 T.C. at 1063. The IRS, however, 
refuses to follow Johnson. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408. 
96. Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. at 1063. 
97. That distinction-the sharing of property among relatives or family mem-
bers-was discussed in Crown: 
[T]here are policy considerations which militate against 
viewing the value use of money or property as a taxable event 
for gift tax purposes ••.• [The IRS position] could be ex-
tended to a multitude of situations involving gratuitous use or 
sharing of real or personal property among relatives. The ap-
plication of the gift tax to common intra-family sharing or use 
of property seems administratively unmanageable and such 
situations point up the difficulty with the concept of gift taxa-
tion attaching to mere permissive use. 
67 T.C. at 1065. 
98. "As to any property, or part thereof or interest therein, of which the donor has 
so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to change its disposi-
tion, whether for his own benefit or the benefit of another, the gift is complete." Treas. 
Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958) (emphasis added). Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408. 
99. Free use of real estate may be taxable when the donee has exclusive use of it, 
but the reasoning of Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, does not apply to either the shar-
17
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through lifetime transfers.loo Logically, then, all transfer-for-
consumption exchanges as well as the shared use of property 
should be exempt from gift tax, provided the transfers do not 
result in the donee acquiring power of disposition over property 
of significant value.10l 
D. INCOME TAX AND GIFT TAX LIABILITY UNDER SHARE Ex-
PENSES AGREEMENTS 
Often, both partners in the de facto family have outside in-
come. For the family that rents its living quarters, the tax treat-
ment of contributions to rent are quite simple. The parties are 
merely splitting personal rental expenses under the rationale of 
the car pooling doctrine.l02 If one of them owns the real estate, 
however, cash contributions by the nontitle holder may be rental 
incomelOS unless a gift can be shown.104 The presence of an in-
come pooling or expense sharing agreement undercuts anyargu-
ment that the money is intended as a gift. 
Nothing is gained by treating the arrangement as a rental 
transaction. Rental hlcome can be offset by income-related ex-
penses,l°5 but the largest of these (state and local property 
taxes,108 and mortgage interestl07) are already deductible by 
every property owner. When a transaction is not profit moti-
ing of property or to services because neither constitutes a transfer of property. 
100. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 
(1945). Some courts hold that protection of the income tax is another purpose of the gift 
tax. Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d at 235 n.2. See IRS Letter Ruling 7921017 (Feb. 
16, 1979) (transfer taxed as both income and a gift). 
101. See ALI ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT 17 (1968) [hereinafter cited as GIFT 
TAX PROJECT]. The American Law Institute proposal exempts transfers for the benefit of 
any person residing in the transferor's household, so long as the expenditure does not 
provide the donee with property that will retain significant value after one year from the 
date of expenditure. ld. at 19. 
102. Rev. Rul. 55-555, 1955-2 C.B. 20. See text accompanying note 92 supra. 
103. I.R.C. § 61(a)(5). Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8 (1957) (gross income includes rents re-
ceived from the occupancy of real estate). 
104. I.R.C. § 102(a) states the general rule that gross income does not include the 
value of property acquired by gift. 
105. I.R.C. § 162(a). Depreciation (I.R.C. § 167(a)(2» is a mandatory deduction for 
income producing property. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-10(a) (1956). Failure to take the 
proper deduction attributable to income in the taxable years it is allowed does not pre-
clude a later accounting for that depreciation deduction, and an increase in taxable gain 
when the property is sold. 
106. I.R.C. § 164(a). 
107. I.R.C. § 163(a). 
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vated, deductions may not exceed income and a loss may not be 
shown for tax purposes. lOB If the parties' agreement sets a value 
on the lodging which is less than the fair market rental value of 
the housing, the transaction may be scrutinized as not profit 
motivated.lo9 
One response to the problem of unintended taxable income 
is joint ownership, where contributions by both parties go to 
their respective equities in the property. Placing property in 
joint ownership, however, is irrevocable. It can also give rise to 
gift tax liability. 
The undivided interest and survivorship features of joint 
tenancyllO may make this form of co-ownership attractive to de 
facto families who seek to emulate either marital joint tenancy 
or community property. However, creating any form of co-own-
ership where the interests of the contenants do not correspond 
with actual contributions results in a taxable gift.lll If title is 
conveyed, a gift has been made.1l2 The fact that the donor re-
108. I.R.C. § 183(b)(2). 
109. The IRS view is valid where separate quarters (a fiat, separate apartment, or 
distinct housing unit) are involved. It is generally inapposite where the parties share the 
same living space, because of the difficulty in valuing permissive use. A separate housing 
unit which is not offered at a bargain rate to a relative or friend would be available to 
the public at its fair market value; the personal quarters of the householder normally 
would not. 
110. For the estate tax consequences of a gift of property in joint tenancy, see notes 
193-197 and accompanying text, infra. 
111. For example, A purchases real property with personal funds and has title con-
veyed to himself or herself and another party B as joint owners, with rights of survivor-
ship which may be defeated by either party severing his or her interest. A has made a 
gift of half the value of the property to B. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(5) (1958). 
The exact form a cotenancy takes is governed by local law. Generally, property ac-
quired by cohabitants belongs to the holder of legal title. Common law emphasizes fortu-
itous or calculated taking of title so that even if the parties previously entered into a 50-
50 agreement, some courts impose a tenancy in common. See generally I. BAXTER, supra 
note 7, at 560-76 and cases therein. 
112. There are several important statutory provisions which limit the taxation of 
marital intra-family transfers of wealth which are not available to de .facto families. The 
most significant allows one-half the value of a gift between spouses to escape tax. !.R.C. 
§ 2523. The splitting provision equalizes gift tax treatment between community property 
and common law states. R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 94, at 1111.03. 
The second relates to purchase of a home. Despite the general rule on taxation of 
disproportionate interests, creation of a tenancy by the entirety or a joint tenancy in real 
property between husband and wife is not considered a gift unless the owner intends a 
gift. I.R.C. § 2515. Why any donor would choose to treat a transfer as a taxable gift when 
not necessary is answered partly by the difference in gift tax treatment of the termina-
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tains the ability to receive all the property upon the death of the 
donee does not preclude a taxable gift.11s 
In general, when two persons assume a mortgage upon 
which both are individually liable, each is a purchaser to the ex-
tent of one-half the debt assumed. If one cotenant contributes 
disproportionately toward the purchase price, however, the ex-
cess contribution is a taxable gift.11• Subsequent unequal contri-
butions are also gifts in the year made.H5 
Payments on a residential mortgage in the early years go 
mostly to interest. If both parties are jointly and severally liable, 
payments on behalf of the non-contributor are neither income 
nor gift;116 only the portion of the mortgage payment applied to-
ward the donee's share of the principal is a taxable gift. So long 
as principal payments remain under $6,000 annually, gift tax can 
be avoided.117 
A revocable trust,118 on the other hand, would both retain 
tions of cotenancies involving jointly held marital real property. That, in turn, depends 
on whether the property was previously subject to gift tax. For a discussion of the tax 
consequences of non-election, see H. DUBROFF & D. KAHN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF Es-
TATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 352-59 (3d ed. 1980). The election covers subsequent improve-
ments and other additions in value to the property, such as mortgage payments. See 
I.R.C. § 2515(c)(2). 
113. See note 111 supra. 
114. R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 94, at 11 10.05[1]. 
115. Examples are mortgage payments and capital improvements. See id. 
116. Nicodemus v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 25 (1932) (despite the general rule on 
apportionment according to interests, when parties share a joint and several obligation, 
the deduction for real estate taxes and interest is allowed to the party who makes the 
payment out of his or her separate funds). Accord, Blackburn v. Commissioner, 38 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1048 (1978); Finney v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1976). 
117. With two joint tenants, only half the principal amount constitutes a gift; $3,000 
faIls within the annual exclusion. I.R.C. § 2503(b). When the property is later sold, in-
come tax rules take effect. In computing gain for income tax purposes, the basis of a 
donee's interest at the time of sale is the same as it would have been in the hands of the 
donor. For purposes of computing a loss, it is the lesser of the donor's basis or the fair 
market value at the time of the gift. I.R.C. §1015(a). In either case, the basis is increased 
by the amount of the gift tax paid, but not to exceed the fair market value of the prop-
erty at the time of the gift. I.R.C. § 1015(d). For gifts made after 1976, only that portion 
of the gift tax paid which is attributable to the appreciation in value of the property 
while in the hands of the donor may be added. I.R.C. § 1015(d)(6). 
118. The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and to the extent he or she reserves 
such a power. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 (1959). Historically, property 
transferred in trust to a person in consideration of an agreement to cohabit illegally with 
the settlor was invalid as against public policy. ld. § 64. Cohabitation is no longer illegal 
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title and avoid gift tax.U9 An agreement allocating payments by 
the non-title holder to that person's interest in the property 
would seem to preclude having to treat those payments as rent. 
Alternatively, the IRS might argue that periodic contributions 
received by the title holder are gain from the sale of the prop-
erty on an installment basis. This also would not be true under 
an express or even an implied trust theory. And in California at 
least, prior or contemporaneous payment is not a prerequisite to 
a resulting trust, so that an implied trust can arise even when 
payments are made after the conveyance.120 
Intrafamily exchanges are generally marked by a sense of 
personal obligation and donative intent. Where sharing of prop-
erty is involved-even when there is a reciprocal exchange of 
services-the situation lacks the free exchange and self-interest 
characteristic of the open market, arm's length transaction. Be-
cause support concerns personal living expenses rather than ac-
cretions in wealth, in the absence of a clear profit motive, all 
intrafamily exchanges of services, transfers for consumption, and 
sharing of property should be exempted from income, gift, and 
estate taxes.121 
v. PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS 
A married taxpayer who files a separate income tax return is 
entitled to a dependency exemption for his or her spouse.122 An 
exemption is also provided for both the taxpayer and spouse on 
a joint return.123 There is no exemption for a common law 
spouse if the state of their domicile does not recognize common 
law marriage.12' 
in California. See generally materials cited notes 3 & 4 supra. 
119. See note 98 supra. See also R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 
94, at n 10.01[5]. . 
120. Viner v. Untrecht, 26 Cal. 2d 261, 158 P.2d 3 (1945); Stone v. Lobsien, 112 Cal. 
App. 2d 750, 247 P.2d 357 (1952). In Stone, circumstances showed an implied promise to 
make the installment payments. That was sufficient to find a resulting trust. ld. at 756, 
247 P.2d at 360. 
121. See GIFT TAX PROJECT, supra note 101, at 19. 
122. I.R.C. § 151(b) allows an exemption of $1,000 for the taxpayer. An additional 
exemption of $1,000 is allowed for the taxpayer's spouse if the taxpayer does not file a 
joint return and the spouse has no gross income and is not the dependent of another 
taxpayer. . 
123. I.R.C. § 6013 allows a married couple to file a single joint return. 
124. lR.C. § 152(b)(5). H.R. REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1957), re-
printed in 1958-3 C.B. 811, 817-18. Accord, Peacock v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 
21
Zaidel: Taxation of of De Facto Families
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
868 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.ll:847 
The Code does allow an exemption for an "individual . . . 
who . . . has as his principal place of abode the home of the 
taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's household. "1211 There 
are, however, three major obstacles to gaining a dependencyex-
emption for a de facto family member under this definition: (1) 
the dependent's gross income must be less than $1,000;128 (2) the 
relationship may be held in violation of locallaw;127 and (3) the 
relationship may be characterized by the courts as an exchange 
of services, not support.128 
In the leading case, Turnipseed v. Commissioner,129 the tax-
payer violated the criminal laws of Alabama130 by living with a 
woman who was married to another man. Turnipseed claimed 
her as a dependent. The Tax Court was unable to find any legis-
lative guidance, but reasoned that "Congress never intended the 
specific paragraph in question [Code section 152(a)(9)] to be 
construed so literally as to permit a dependency exemption for 
an individual whom the taxpayer is maintaining in an illicit rela-
tionship in conscious violation of the criminal laws of the juris-
diction of his abode. "131 The House Report to the Technical 
Amendments Act of 1958132 confirmed the holding in Turnip-
seed that persons in an illicit relationship cannot constitute a 
household.133 That report was issued in 1957 when nonmarital 
cohabitation was generally illegal/34 but it still shapes the 
177 (1978), appeal dismissed nolle pros. by taxpayer. 
125. I.R.C. § 151(e) allows a $1,000 exemption for each dependent as defined in 
I.R.C. § 152. 
126. I.R.C. § 151(e)(1)(A). 
127. See text accompanying notes 129-133 infra. 
128. See text accompanying notes 135-143 infra. 
129. 27 T.C. 758 (1957). 
130. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 16 (1940) (currently at § 13-8-1 (1975». 
131. 27 T.C. at 760. -
132. Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 4, 72 Stat. 1606 (1958) (codified at I.R.C. § 152(b)(5». 
133. H.R. REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1957) reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 
811, 817-18. 
134. Bruch, supra note 7, at 132 n.115. California has since repealed criminal sanc-
tions for sexual activity between consenting adults. 1975 Cal. Stats., ch. 71, §§ 5-12. 
Compare California's neutral standard formulated in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 
557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (mores have changed so radically that a standard 
based on moral considerations cannot be imposed) with Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty., 
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (citing biblical quotes 
in upholding a Virginia sodomy statute). 
The possible unconstitutionality of such statutes may not be used to attack I.R.C. § 
152(b)(5). Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1979), aff'g 36 T.C.M. 934 
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courts' thinking. Even if a state has no statute proscribing a par-
ticular living arrangement, the court can refuse to allow the ex-
emption on the grounds that meals, lodging, and other amenities 
furnished a cohabitant are remuneration for services, not 
support.131S 
In Bombarger v. Commissioner,136 the taxpayer and her son 
moved in with Winnie Stewart and her husband. The 
Bombargers remained after Stewart's husband died. Bombarger 
had an outside job, Stewart did the housework; the women con-
sidered themselves "just like mother and daughter."13'1 Because 
she viewed herself as having furnished the support of the house-
hold, Bombarger requested a finding that Stewart resided in her 
"home" for purposes of the dependency exemption,138 but was 
denied the exemption because Stewart owned the house.13D The 
court found other grounds as well on which to deny the exemp-
tion: "These parties are mutually dependent upon one another. 
Each contributes something the other needs and each receives a 
benefit from a mutually satisfactory arrangement. "140 The deter-
mination of mutual dependency was dictum. Furthermore, the 
court ignored the fundamental principle that the law should tax 
those who are best able to pay. When applied consistently to 
cases of mutual dependency between de facto spouses, that prin-
ciple supports a personal exemption for a non-wage earning 
housekeeper. 
An example of the Tax Court's undue emphasis on the ele-
ment of gift involved in support is Hamilton v. Commissioner.141 
In Hamilton, the Tax Court analyzed a similar situation under 
(CCH) (1977) (the Commissioner cannot be required to determine the constitutionality 
of such a law). Contra, In re M.M. Shackelford, 45 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 2d (P-H) 11 80-529 
(D.C. Mo. 1980) (dictum) (Missouri statute prescribing criminal sanctions for unmarried 
cohabitation was unconstitutional). 
135. See Massey v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1931); Hamilton v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C. 927 (1960); Provita v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1318 (1970); Ang-
stadt v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 693 (1968). 
136. 31 T.C. 473 (1957). 
137. ld. at 474. 
138. I.R.C. § 152(a)(9) includes in the definition of a dependent "an individual. . • 
who for the taxable year of the taxpayer, has as his principal place of abode the home of 
the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's household." 
139. 31 T.C. at 475. 
140. ld. at 476. 
141. 34 T.C. 927 (1960). 
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the history of the household member exemption and decided 
that Code section 152(a)(9) was intended for foster children, not 
unmarried adult housekeepers.142 Explaining the nature of 
support, the court said that, in the case of foster children, "sup-
port would be gratuitous and given to the recipient from motives 
of charity, affection, or moral obligation without thought of re-
ceiving in return a quid pro quO.m43 
The court did not face the realities of foster care. Whatever 
the foster parents' motive in caring for foster children, they do 
receive an inducement in the form of foster care payments.144 
The dependency exemption is simply one more incentive to en-
courage foster care. The family with foster children is in fact a 
de facto family, one sanctioned by both Congress145 and the 
states.146 The Tax Court itself already allows exemptions for a 
cohabitant's children/4 '1 not because of the absence of any "quid 
142. Id. at 929. 
143. Id. 
144. In California, monthly rates for foster care are set by the county and (as of 
1972) vary from $72 to $160. R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 521 n.36 (1978). 
Most foster parents are middle to lower middle class and over age 40. Id. at 521. There 
are an estimated 243,600 children in foster homes. Id. at 514 n.2. 
145. The federal government, under the Social Security Act, reimburses states for a 
portion of foster care costs for children meeting financial eligibility requirements. 42 
U.S.C. § 608(a) (1976). 
146. In California, the state is primarily concerned with financing foster care al-
though it is also concerned with supervising and licensing the program. See CAL. WELF. 
& INST. CODE §§ 16510-16511 (West 1980); 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE ch. 6, §§ 85015-85175 
(1980). 
147. See Peacock v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 177 (1978), appeal dismissed, 
nolle pros. by taxpayer (exemption allowed for cohabitant's child, but not for cohabi-
tant). Illanovsky v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 225, 226 (1965) (dictum) (marital 
status of the couple does not affect their right to claim children as dependents). In dis-
tinguishing Turnipseed v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 758 (1957), Estate of Daniel Buckley v. 
Commissioner, 37 T.C. 664 (1962) and Unterman v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 93 (1963), the 
Illanovsky court stated in dictum: 
In each of these cases the taxpayer was not entitled to an ex-
emption for the woman with whom he lived because their rela-
tionship violated local law. But none of these cases concern 
children living with the taxpayer. Even if we assume that the 
..• [couple was] not legally married, that alone would not af-
fect their right to claim the children as dependents. 
Id. at 226. See also Rev. Rul. 54-498, 1954-2 C.B. 107 (exemption allowed for illegitimate 
child). 
Where more than one person provides support for the children in the household, 
there may be some proof problems in establishing the precise amounts contributed. 
There is some case authority that a person who supplies more than half the aggregate 
support for a group of persons has supplied more than half for each of them, and that 
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pro quo," but more likely due to the children's ignorance of pa-
rental lifestyle. Denying personal exemptions to de facto spouses 
on the grounds that the relationship is "illicit," or that support 
and services are bargained for compensation, is anachronistic. 
An encouraging sign is In re M.M. Shackelford,148 a recent 
bankruptcy case. In Shackelford, the taxpayer was a single wo-
man who lived with her three children and a single man. Their 
living arrangement violated a Missouri statute that made any 
open and notorious adulterous situation or lewd cohabitation a 
misdemeanor. The IRS denied the exemption for the man. The 
bankruptcy court allowed the exemption and held the living ar-
rangement lawful based on a modern reading of state statute, 
legislative history, and existing case law.149 The court noted that 
although, in the past, the mere act of living together was con-
strued as lewd and lascivious behavior, it was not so today.lIIO 
One case does not necessarily herald a trend, but the decision 
does significantly expand the parameters of qualified depen-
dents, and may open the courts to further challenges of the 
strict IRS view. 
the cost of maintaining the household generally inures equally to each dependent. Fisher 
v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1144 (1951); Dunn v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 11 63,189 
(1963). 
Alternatively, when two or more persons each furnish more than 10% of the child's 
support, together they provide at least 50%, and none individually furnishes more than 
50% of each child's support, they may sign a "multiple support agreement." I.R.C. § 
152(c). Under this arrangement, anyone of the supporters (the highest income partner, 
for example) may claim all the exemptions, thereby reducing that person's marginal tax 
rate, and lessening the overall household tax bill. 
148. 45 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 2d (P~H) 11 80-529 (D.C. Mo. 1980). 
149. The court explained: 
It is not for this Court to say that two unmarried persons liv-
ing together is a step ahead or behind two unmm:rieds holding 
themselves out as husband and wife. • • • It is not within the 
jurisdiction of this Court to establish a code of morals for 
taxpayers. 
[d. at 80-1076. 
150. If one goes far enough back in case law, perhaps such conduct 
[unmarried cohabitation] could be said to be in violation of 
• • • state law . • • • [B]ut in this day and age, can it be said 
that merely living together is open, gross lewdness or lascivi-
ous behavior? Does this conduct openly outrage decency? Is it 
injurious to public morals? • . • I think not. 
[d. (Barker, C.J.). 
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VI. DISSOLUTION OF THE FAMILY: GIFT AND INCOME 
TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
A. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS 
During marriage, payments to support a spouse or children 
are not taxable income to the recipient, and generally do not 
comprise taxable gifts.llll Voluntary payments made. after the 
dissolution of a marriage similarly remain outside the ambit of 
the income tax.11l2 The Code does, however, tax as income cer-
tain mandatory spousal support payments incident to dissolu-
tion of a marriage. IllS 
Dissolution of a de facto family may be accompanied by 
similar separate maintenance payments.1M De facto family mem-
bers have no reasonable expectations of support based on status, 
but they can create their own support rights and duties through 
151. Burkhart v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 275 (1928); Crittenden v. United States, 
[52-2] U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1110,870 (E.D. Wis. 1952). Support is relative to the family's 
station in life. For a discussion of some thorny problems which can arise in determining 
the extent or value of this support obligation, see R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, 
supra note 94, at II 10.02[5][a]. 
152. See Treas. Reg. § 1.75-1(b) (1957). 
153. The major sections governing these separate maintenance payments are I.R.C. 
§§ 61(a)(8), 71 (inclusion in gross income of amounts received); 215 (deduction of pay-
ments); and 7701(a)(17) (defining "husband" and "wife"). I.R.C. § 71(a) defines three 
types of alimony and separate maintenance payments which are includable in the recipi-
ent's gross income. Those are payments arising under (1) a decree of divorce or separate 
maintenance; (2) a written separation agreement; or (3) a decree for support. 
I.R.C. § 71(a) includes in the recipient's gross income periodic payments received "in 
discharge of a legal obligation, which because of the marital or family relationship is 
imposed on or incurred by" a payor under a written agreement. (Emphasis added.) Pay-
ments can be ."periodic" even though not made at regular intervals; a lump-sum amount 
specified in the written agreement would not be includable in the recipient's income even 
if paid in installments. Distinguishing periodic payments from installment payments is 
not always easy, but § 71(c) provides guidelines. In general, payments continuing for 
more than 10 years are considered periodic payments even if a lump-sum is specified in 
the decree. I.R.C. § 71(c)(2). Prince v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1058 (1976) (property set-
tlement payments over 121 months are alimony); Ryker v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 924 
(1960) (language that 121 payments were part of property division was not controlling. 
The payments were taxable to the recipient as income). I.R.C. § 215 excludes from the 
gross income of the payor amounts includable in the income of the recipient. 
Oral agreements do not qualify. Alexander v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 969 
(1979) (fact that recipient included payments in income was irrelevant). Accord, Kievler 
v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1042 (1969). 
154. See Property Rights of a Same-Sex Couple, supra note 7, at 419 (citing Rich-
ardson v. Conley, No. 416547 (San Diego County Super. Ct., May 17, 1978» (temporary 
support awarded upon the dissolution of a lesbian household). 
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contract. One provision might allow for the separate mainte-
nance of one of the parties following the break up of the" living 
unit. Unless these payments are viewed as equivalent to marital 
alimony and separate maintenance payments, they will be sub-
jected to double taxation: initially when earned by the obligor, 
and again when paid over to the recipient.11111 
Non-marital support payments can be treated the same as 
marital alimony and separate maintenance payments without se-
verely distorting statutory language or contravening congres-
sional intent. The Revenue Act of 19421116 evinced a dual intent 
regarding such support payments. Congress promulgated the Act 
to (1) tax only the party beneficially receiving the income, and 
(2) produce "uniformity" in the treatment of amounts paid in 
the nature of or in lieu of alimony, regardless of variance in dif-
ferent states concerning the existence and continuance of an ob-
ligation to pay alimony.1117 The pertinent Code sectionsl118 treat 
alimony and separate maintenance payments as income to the 
wife and allow a corresponding deduction to the husband for 
such amounts. When the flow of payments is reversed so that 
the wife pays, "husband" means wife and "wife" means hus-
band.1119 Thus, "wife" and "husband" are interchangeable terms, 
serving only to identify the recipient and payor in order to avoid 
double taxation. It is not so great a step to extend these provi-
sions to putative spouses and, logically, to de facto spouses as 
well.160 
155. See I.R.C. § 6l. 
156. Pub. L. No. 753, § 120, 56 Stat. 798 (amending Int. Rev. Code of 1939, Ch. 1, § 
22, 53 Stat. 9 (now I.R.C. § 71». 
157. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 
372,427. Lack of a state support obligation is no bar. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 
16 T.C. 623 (1951) (treatment of payments is not determined by state law characteriza-
tion); Harris v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 895 (1952) (payments taxed as alimony 
even though Louisiana imposes no duty of support on a divorced husband). 
158. See note 153 supra. 
159. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(17). 
160. Although courts consistently hold that determination of the parties' marital 
status is governed by the law of their domicile, e.g., Boyter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 
(1980), the characterization of a dissolution is not binding for federal tax purposes. 
State characterizations notwithstanding, certain payments under a written agree-
ment incident to an annulment of a void or voidable marriage (like those under divorce 
or separation) may be deductible by the payor and includable in gross income by the 
recipient. Reisman v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 570 (1968), acq. 1971-2 C.B. 3. See also 
Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 
(1966) (payments were deductible by payor and income to recipient even though divorce 
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For example, Newburger v. CommissionerI6I illustrates the 
Tax Court's flexible interpretation of the Revenue Act of 1942. 
Newburger's wife sued for separation. He counterclaimed and 
obtained an annulment based on the invalidity of the wife's ear-
lier ex parte divorce.I62 The court ordered him to pay $150 per 
week support.I6S The IRS argued the payments were not deduct-
ible because Newburger had no legal obligation under New York 
law, but the Tax Court held the putative marriage created a le-
gal obligation and allowed him the deduction.I64 
The deductibility of payments is a relief measure which-by 
taxing only the party who beneficially receives the in-
come-encourages obligors to make support payments. It applies 
to those payments made because of the "family or marital rela-
tionship in recognition of the general obligation to support 
which is made specific by the decree, instrument or agree-
ment."I615 Because of increasing societal and judicial acceptance 
of de facto families, the "general obligation to support" should 
be predicated on the mutual expectations and needs of the par-
ties.I66 Newburger is an important step toward recognizing de 
facto family life and is consistent with the express congressional 
intent to treat spousal support payments uniformly.167 
Temporary support or rehabilitation payments received by 
one of the partners following dissolution of a de facto family are 
probably income in any event.I68 The IRS will likely take the 
position that court ordered payments incident to the dissolution 
of a de facto family are the discharge of a contractual obligation, 
hence a nondeductible personal expense to the obligor.I69 Failure 
of the courts to extend Newburger will, therefore, result in the 
was invalid in New York). But see Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65 (IRS will not follow 
these Second Circuit decisions). Compare Lee v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 552 (1974) (re-
jecting Borax) with Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457 (1974) (following Borax). 
161. 61 T.C. 457 (1974). 
162.ld. 
163. ld. at 458. 
164. ld. at 460. 
165. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1957). 
166. See notes 1-4 supra. 
167. See note 157 supra. 
168. See 1.R.C. § 61. 
169. See Newburger v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 457 (1974). I.R.C. § 262 makes per-
sonal expenses nondeductible. 
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inequity of double taxation. 
B. PROPERTY DIVISIONS 
Marital dissolution actions commonly provide for the divi-
sion of property. A property settlement is not income to the re-
cipient because courts find an implied agreement that the mari-
tal rights surrendered equal the amount received,I'1O and such a 
settlement is generally not subject to gift tax.l'11 
De facto family property settlements do not fall squarely 
within any statutory provision. They must be analyzed under 
the general rules governing transfers of property. Severance of 
joint tenancy property does not result in gain or loss for income 
tax purposes and the partition of jointly owned property accord-
ing to contributions does not create a taxable gift.l'12 When prop-
erty held in one name is partitioned disproportionately upon the 
dissolution of a de facto family, the tax consequences may de-
pend upon the cause of action vindicated, although state charac-
terizations of the form of recovery are not necessarily binding 
for federal tax purposes.1'18 
170. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). The Davis Court assumed the par-
ties negotiated at arm's length and judged the marital rights to be equal in value to the 
property for which they were exchanged. Because there are generally no income tax con-
sequences to the recipient of a property distribution incident to a divorce, does not 
necessarily mean there are none to the transferor. See note 188 infra and accompanying 
text. 
171. I.R.C. § 2516 (transfer of property or interests in property made under a qual-
ified written agreement in settlement of marital or property rights is considered to be 
made for full and adequate compensation). But see Rev. RuI. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414 
(distinguishing settlement of support rights from inheritance rights). A transfer to satisfy 
the support obligation which normally lasts as long as both spouses live, or until the 
recipient remarries, does not diminish the transferor's estate any more than any other 
personal obligation. But a settlement of inheritance rights is a present transfer of what 
would otherwise be a major portion of the payor's estate on death. Consequently, a 
transfer of property under a divorce decree is a gift to the extent the value of the prop-
erty exceeds the value of the support rights surrendered. Id. See also R. STEPHENS, G. 
MAxFIELD & A. LIND, supra note 94, at 1110.02[5] [a] (discussing the difficulties of valuing 
support rights). 
172. It must first be determined whether the creation of the joint tenancy involved a 
completed gift. If not, each party must withdraw her respective contribution plus the net 
income attributable to it, or a taxable gift occurs. See Stinehart, Tax Implications of the 
Forms of Spousal Co-ownership, 6 COMM. PROP. J. 25, 41 (1979). 
173. Bruch, supra note 7, at 129. 
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Gift Tax 
An unmarried cohabitant may be granted relief under a va-
riety of equitable theories,17. the resulting trust,t'115 constructive 
trust,1'16 or implied domestic partnership.1'1'1 These remedies fo-
cus on real or imagined economic contributions to property and 
can result in gift tax liability to the extent the recipient's recov-
ery exceeds consideration given.1'18 Here, the absence of a mari-
tal relationship may prove advantageous to the unmarried 
couple-at least to the extent the property distribution is court-
ordered. Not all exchanges lacking full consideration in money 
174. See note 4 supra. 
175. A resulting trust arises when a person makes or causes to be made a disposition 
of property under circumstances which raise the inference that she does not intend the 
person taking or holding the property to have the beneficial interest in the property, 
where the inference is not rebutted, and the beneficial interest is not otherwise effec-
tively disposed of. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 404 (1959). It may arise where 
property is purchased and the purchase price is paid by one person and at her direction 
the vendor transfers the property to another person. ld. §§ 440-460. A resulting trust is 
appropriate where one partner contributed to the purchase price of property, but title 
stands in the name of the other. Pfaff, supra note 7, at 189. Compare McDonald V. Carr, 
150 m. 204, 37 N.E. 225 (1895) (resulting trust permitted for a non-family relationship of 
20 years duration; one party purchased the land and placed title in cohabitant's name), 
with Creasman V. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948) (trust recovery denied). In 
Creasman, one party purchased property, made additions, and put it in cohabitant's 
name. The court held that, absent evidence to the contrary, it was presumed the parties 
disposed of the property as they intended because they deliberately made disposition 
between themselves. But see In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 
(1972) (recovery allowed on other grounds). The court said: "Arguably, Creasman should 
be over-ruled and its archaic presumption invalidated." ld. at 75, 499 P.2d at 867. 
The resulting trust theory works best where both parties have incomes and contrib-
. ute their earnings to a common fund to purchase property. Pfaff, supra note 7, at 192. 
The theory is inapplicable where one partner works at a salaried position and the other 
is a homemaker. ld. 
176. A constructive trust is a relationship concerning property subjecting the person 
by whom title to the property is held to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the 
grounds that retention of the property is wrongful and would result in unjust enrich-
ment. It arises not from intention but as an equitable remedy. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § l(e) (1959). Fraud is the essential element, but the inherent flexibility in the 
doctrine makes it a useful last resort for de facto families without a remedy. Pfaff, supra 
note 7, at 193. 
177. Domestic partnership claims provide the best avenue in those courts which are 
willing to view the relationship as an economic arrangement in which one party provides 
capital, the other services. This claim still seems to require some type of business ar-
rangement. E.g., In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972) (implied 
partnership found in the operation of cattle ranch). The better view finds the very exis-
tence of a non-marital relationship a joint economic venture. See generally Pfaff, supra 
note 7, at 185-89. 
178. See generally notes 22-23 supra. 
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or money's worth are taxable gifts.179 TreasUry Regulations ex-
clude sales, exchanges, and transfers of property "made in the 
ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at 
arm's length, and free from any donative intent) .... "lSO 
Court-imposed property settlements probably qualify as exempt 
exchanges.lsl The key is the involuntariness of the transfer. Ab-
sent an intention by the donor to circumvent the estate tax by 
voluntarily depleting the estate, there is no reason to subject the 
transaction to gift tax.1S2 
Income Tax 
A more difficult situation arises when a money or property 
division is' tailored to compensate the plaintiff for the value of 
services rendered, or to restore the value of benefits received by 
the defendant. Any amount received under a breach of con-
tractlS3 or quantum meruitlSl claim has generally been includ-
able in' gross income as compensation for services. 
In Cotnam v. Commissioner,lSG for example, a woman quit 
179. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958). 
180. [d. 
181. The gift tax applies only to voluntary transfers. Harris v. Commissioner, 340 
U.S. 106 (1950). In Harris, the Court explained: 
[d. at 112. 
This [divorce settlement] transaction is not "in the ordinary 
course of business" in any conventional sense .... But if two 
partners on dissolution of a firm entered into a transaction of 
this character or if Chancery did it for them, there would seem 
to be no doubt that the [settlement would be tax free] .•.. 
No reason is apparent why husband and wife should be under 
a heavier handicap • • • • 
182. See id. Accordingly, the reasoning of Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414, dis-
cussed in note 171 supra, does not apply, even if the de facto spouse's support rights are 
valued at zero. That ruling distinguished settlement of marital support rights from set-
tlement of inheritance rights and found gift tax liability in the latter. De facto spouses 
have no inheritance rights. For income tax consequences to the de facto spouse whose 
support and inheritance rights are valued at zero, see notes 189-191 infra and accompa-
nying text. 
183. Cohabitation alone does not give rise to rights in the property of the other 
partner, but express agreements between the cohabitants are enforceable if illicit sex is 
not the sole consideration. See generally materials cited note 7 supra. An implied agree-
ment may lead only to a presumption that the services were rendered gratuitously. York 
v. Place, 273 Or. 947, 949, 544 P.2d 572, 574 (1975). 
184. Quantum meruit is a legal action brought on an existing but unenforceable con-
tract. It requires evidence of specific services and is subject to attack on the basis of 
illegal consideration. Pfaff, supra note 7, at 187. 
185. 28 T.C. 947 (1957), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959). 
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her job and moved into a man's residence to "render services 
and attention as an attendant or friend,"ls6 in exchange for one-
fifth his estate. The man died intestate in 1945 but Cotnam re-
ceived judgment for $120,000, less attorney's fees of $50,366. 
The Tax Court classified the recovery as delayed compensation 
for services rather than a tax-free bequest. The entire $120,000 
was included in her income, spread over the four-and-a-half year 
period during which it was "earned."IS'1 Cotnam was allowed a 
deduction for attorney's fees, but only in the year in which they 
were paid. Because the attorney's fees in the year paid far ex-
ceeded her other income for that year, much of the deduction 
was useless. 
Property Division 
A final consideration is the income tax consequences of a 
property division. Even the transfer of property in exchange for 
the release of marital rights results in taxable gain to the payor 
if the value of the property at the time of the transfer exceeds 
the' transf~ror's basis in that property. ISS 
The other side of the transaction concerns the recipient. 
Neither marital nor de facto spouses have a financial basis in 
their support rights, having paid nothing for them in the first 
place. The difference between the value of property received and 
the basis in the rights surrendered (zero) is logically all taxable 
186. 263 F.2d at 120 n.1. 
187. The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and accepted Cotnam's position that 
the attorney's fees were not includable in income. The court of appeals relied on an 
Alabama statute which provided that an attorney has "the same right and power over 
said suits, judgments and decrees, to enforce their liens as their clients had or may have 
for the amount due thereon to them." ld. at 125 (citing ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 64 (1940». 
Absent a specific statute like Alabama's, courts have consistently refused to follow 
the Fifth Circuit, reaffirming the Tax Court holding in Cotnam and the general rule that 
a lien is not a right or title in the recovery. Accordingly, the entire recovery is taxable 
income to the litigant even though she never receives that portion which goes to the 
attorney. E.g., Estate of Gadlow v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 975 (1968). 
188. In United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), a Delaware taxpayer, under a 
property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree, transferred to his for-
mer wife appreciated shares of stock in return for the release of her marital rights. The 
court found the transfer not a nontaxable division of property between co-owners but 
rather a taxable transfer of property in satisfaction of a legal obligation. Accordingly, he 
was taxed on the difference between his adjusted basis in the property and its fair mar-
ket value on the date of transfer. 
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gain.lS9 Even under community property rules, where a divorce 
settlement is viewed as a division of property belonging to the 
marital partnership, the use of any separate property to satisfy 
the settlement gives rise to a taxable event.190 
There is room here for improvement in the treatment of 
both marital and de facto families. What is really being trans-
ferred in most property settlements is title, possession, and use 
of tangible property the couple previously shared. It would be 
more sensible to treat the dissolution property transfer as a non-
taxable event, carry the old basis of the property over to the new 
owner, and defer taxation until the new owner sells it. The 
courts, however, have not accepted this view.191 
VII. ESTATE TAX 
A. MARITAL DEDUCTION; JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY 
Except for the marital deduction and a different treatment 
of joint tenancy property, estate tax laws treat married and un-
married households basically alike. The marital deduction is a 
major benefit because it allows the greater of $250,000 or fifty 
percent of the value of property passing to the surviving spouse 
to be deducted from the decedent's gross estate.192 
The survivorship feature of joint tenancy allows property to 
pass to the surviving cotenant outside the decedent's estate and 
free of claims by the decedent's creditors.19s Despite the popular 
misconception, it does not exclude the value of the property for 
189. See I.R.C. § 1001. The IRS bas ruled-without really explaining why-that a 
wife in this situation bas no taxable gain. Rev. Rul. 67-221,1967-2 C.B. 63. The de facto 
spouse is in a more tenuous position. The IRS ruling, however, leaves open the possibil-
ity that a future ruling will extend equivalent treatment to de facto spouses, even in the 
absence of congressional action. 
190. Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), aff'd per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 
(9th Cir. 1977). In the Carrieres' California divorce decree, community property was un-
evenly distributed. The husband was required to equalize the division by transferring 
separate property. The Tax Court held that, to the eJ$nt separate property was used to 
acquire a share of the wife's community property, there was a taxable sale on which the 
wife's gain must be recognized. 
191. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 68-71 (1962). 
192. I.R.C. § 2056. This is another form of equalization of treatment between com-
munity property and common law states. R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, supra 
note 94, at 11 5.06[1]. See also notes 6 and 32 supra. 
193. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 615 (abr. ed. 1968). 
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estate tax purposes.194 The entire value of jointly owned prop-
erty (except to the extent that the surviving tenant contributed 
to the cost of the acquisition of the property), including appreci-
ation in value, is included in the estate of the first cotenant to 
die.191i The burden is on the survivors to prove their contribu-
tions if they hope to exclude them from the estate tax base.196 If 
the decedent's interest was acquired gratuitously from another 
co-owner, the value of that interest is not included in the 
estate. 197 
B. CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE 
De facto families intent on preserving the property rights 
and interests of survivors need to draft contracts capable of 
withstanding a court test.198 Contract claims require recitation 
of consideration to support the contract. Thus, a cause of action 
under breach of contract or quantum meruit is a claim for com-
pensation for services performed, and any amount received is in-
cludable in income.199 Framing the claim in testamentary lan-
guage does not necessarily convert the recovery into a tax-free 
legacy or bequest.2oo The issue of whether any amount is taxable 
to the beneficiary generally arises when the recipient maintains 
194. R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD, & S. LIND, supra note 94, at 11 4.12[4]. 
195. I.R.C. § 2040(a). R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND, supra note 94, at 11 
4.12[4]. 
196. [d. at 11 4.12[7][a]. I.R.C. § 2040(c), added by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-600, § 511(a), 92 Stat. 2881, recognizes the value of services contributed by a 
surviving spouse/joint owner of property, provided the property is used in a business or 
farm in which he or she materially participated. Sugar, How New § 2040(c) Alters the 
Estate Tax Burden on Jointly-Owned Property, 50 J. TAX. 270, 272 (1979). The value of 
homemaker's contributions are excluded. 
197. I.R.C. § 2040(a). 
198. See generally Pfaff, supra note 7. Written contracts are more likely to survive 
than oral contracts, which face Statute of Frauds challenges and evidentiary problems. 
Services rendered furnish adequate consideration to support a contract, even if the ser-
vices are minimal. See generally Pfaff, supra note 7. 
199. See Cohen v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (amounts re-
ceived were income because the property was promised to the taxpayer by the decedent 
in exchange for services); Davies v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 524 (1954) (Taxpayer could 
not and did not rely on a mere promise of the decedent unsupported by any considera-
tion, but in each count of her claim mentioned some valuable consideration moving from 
her to him. The Tax Court included the settlement in income.). Rev. Rul. 67-375, 1967-2 
C.B. 60 (distribution of property under the terms of a will in satisfaction of a written 
agreement requiring the taxpayer to perform services for the testator is compensation for 
services, and includable in gross income in the taxable year of receipt). 
200. E.g., Cohen v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (federal tax 
liability is based on the underlying nature and not the form of the claim). 
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the recovery is a gift or bequest,201 while the estate argues the 
amounts constitute settlement of a claim and, therefore, are de-
ductible by the estate.202 Federal tax liability is based on the 
underlying nature of the claim, not its form.203 The court must 
determine the value of personal services rendered to the 
decedent. 
Gertrude Davies, for example, worked for a physician for 
$25 per week from 1941 until her death in 1946.204 In addition, 
she and her husband performed miscellaneous personal services 
for the doctor. To retain her services, the physician orally prom-
ised to bequeath to her one-third of his estate so she would 
"never have to work again."2015 He died intestate. She sued for 
one-third of his $180,000 estate, and settled for $8,500. Davies 
alleged that reasonable compensation for her services from 1941-
1946 would have been $75 to $100 per week. The Tax Court held 
the $8,500 settlement (when added to the $25 per week she had 
formerly received) did not exceed reasonable compensation and 
was, therefore, gross income.206 
Even a close family relationship is not enough to exclude 
the recovery from gross income where business related services 
are rendered. In Cohen v. United States,207 the taxpayer agreed 
to assist his ailing brother in operating a corporation. As an in-
ducement, his brother promised to bequeath corporate stock to 
him, but died without naming Cohen as a legatee. Cohen sued 
for specific performance of the will contract. His entire recovery 
was taxed as income. The district court explained that "love and 
affection combined with the business aspects of the agreement, 
did not change the ordinary contractual obligations which en-
sued .... "20S 
201. I.R.C. § 102 excludes from income amounts received by gift, bequest, devise, or 
inheritance. 
202. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Davies v. 
Commissioner, 23 T.C. 524 (1954). 
203. Cohen v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965). 
204. Davies v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 524 (1954). 
205. ld. at 525. 
206. The court found she "failed to show any part of the $8,500 was received as a 
testamentary gift. ••• n ld. The language of the court leaves open the possibility that, 
had she recovered more than the reasonable value of the services, the excess would have 
been treated as a tax-free bequest. 
207. 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965). 
208. ld. at 742. 
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In First National Bank v. United States,209 a woman sought 
to enforce an oral agreement to make a will in return for manag-
ing the decedent's household, assisting in the operation of the 
ranch, and attending to his personal needs. She released her 
claim in exchange for $65,000 and a ranch in Mexico. The gov-
ernment sought to prevent the reduction of the gross estate by 
the contract claim, and argued that the woman failed to show 
adequate consideration. The court disagreed, found adequate 
consideration, and allowed the deduction to the estate.210 Obvi-
ously, the settlement was income to her. 
The services rendered in all these cases are distinguishable 
from those performed in the household. Because courts and the 
IRS hold domestic services have no value in "money or money's 
worth" as contributions to property acquisitions,211 consistency 
requires the same services not be adjudged "valuable" when set-
tling a claim against the estate. That consistency was lacking in 
Hansen v. Commissioner,212 where the plaintiff received· 
$150,000 in settlement of a claim for compensation for services 
rendered from 1946-1964. The court made no attempt to value 
the services. Because the taxpayer "was not an heir. . . and not 
a legatee under an earlier will,"218 and because she alleged the 
amount was for compensation, the $150,000 was includable in 
income.214 Had she recovered instead under a trust or implied 
domestic partnership theory,21G an argument that domestic ser-
vices lack commercial value might have withstood the IRS chal-
lenge that the recovery was compensation for services, without 
actually jeopardizing the claim itself. It would be unwise to for-
feit a cause of action due to an inaccurately phrased claim, but 
Hansen demonstrates that effective tax planning begins with the 
drafting of the complaint. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
It is commonly said that federal tax liability is based on the 
209. 422 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1970). 
210. Id. at 1388. 
211. I.R.C. §§ 2043(a) (estate tax); 2512(b)(gift tax). 
212. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 43 (1974). 
213. Id. at 45. 
214.Id. 
215. See generally Pfaff, supra note 7. 
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underlying nature of the claim, not its form. It is apparent, how-
ever, that many of the tax provisions governing the economics of 
de facto family life were developed in a commercial context. De 
facto families are on the rise,216 and tax policies favoring cere-
monial marriage are anachronistic. Courts will increasingly face 
tax questions concerning de facto families.217 In order to further 
the general tax policy of equivalent treatment of taxpayers in 
similar situations, courts will be called upon to evaluate the fam-
ily nature of a household. Some suggested factors to consider 
are: 
(1) intermingling of funds; 
(2) sharing of expenses; 
(3) shared use of personal property; 
(4) shared use of housing (as opposed to clearly segregated 
rooms or living areas); 
(5) dependency of one or more household members on an-
other for support; 
(6) duration of the living arrangement; 
(7) extent of gift giving within the household; 
(8) moral obligation to care for another person; and 
(9) intent of the parties. 
The presence of a significant number of these factors indicates 
that the household constitutes a de facto family. The presence of 
a clear profit motive (receiving rental income, for example) 
would help distinguish the more loosely structured roommate or 
non-family situation where incomes, expenses, and assets are 
clearly segregated. The factual determination required is no 
more difficult than that which the courts customarily engage in 
whenever an agreement is implied or an equitable solution im-
posed. Certainly the analysis will be easiest where it will also be 
most prevalent-in the case of couples. Unfortunately, parties 
who enter non-marital living arrangements often do not know 
their existing property rights and are unaware of the tax conse-
quences of their decisions. Unless Congress rectifies the present 
tax inequities, parties to a self-defined relationship will require 
effective tax counseling if they are to mjnjmize their dispropor-
tionate tax burden. 
216. See note 2 supra. 
217. See note 4 supra. 
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